RETHINKING SECURITY

To listen to the National Strategic Narrative’s Mr. Y and others, we’re in an 21st era of “credible influence,” where no one country can “direct global outcomes.” Instead, it credibly influences others with various aims of military power. However, the US is certainly “directing a global outcome” and doing so the 20th century way: with raw military power. Look no further than the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran has repeatedly threatened to use asymmetric tactics to close the Strait of Hormuz, and was given a chance to make good on its threats when it stated clearly that it would oppose US carriers entering the Persian Gulf. But when US carriers completed a regular transit, the Iranians did nothing. And regional experts consider Iran’s larger threats to close the Strait in response to economic sanctions to be largely empty. Why? Because present US forces will devastate the Iranian military, and the rest of the world will let them. This does not mean that the political or military balance of forces will always favor the US, but Iran’s bluff was called and they blinked.

At a time when the idea of victory itself is in doubt or and some dubbed the current era the “end of military history,” it’s worth observing what a clear policy success surrounding the use of force looks like. Force still works—provided that is paired with a sound policy objective and good strategy that is supported by the means and ways available. Deterring adversary disruption of a vital and clear interest—not only for the US, but for China, Russia, and everyone else dependent on the free flow of oil in the Persian Gulf—is precisely the kind of limited and straightforward objective that the US military excels at.

As Dan Trombly and I have written before, the problem is not that force does not work anymore or that the US cannot direct global outcomes. It is that, as per Clausewitz, the ends have to be supported by the ways and means. Unlimited objectives with limited means—particularly when paired to a philosophy that denies the central role of combat in fighting wars—yield bad outcomes.

Next up? The SEAL raid was excellent, but maybe the Somali pirates would feel a bit more careful about hijacking if they didn’t feel so safe hanging out in coastal bases and villages in which they flaunt their ill-gotten gains. Coastal raiding—it’s what the Royal Navy would have done, right?